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Abstract This paper is the ﬁrst attempt to provide an objective assessment
of the quality of real estate funds from operations (FFO)
forecasts. The work, which looks past the more primitive
question concerning the appropriate measure for real estate
earnings, quantiﬁes and tests the quality of real estate investment
trust (REIT) FFO forecasts relative to the net income forecasts
of several comparison groups. The results show the high quality
of REIT forecasts are remarkably robust and are not driven by
the level of analyst attention. Investors in a post-Enron and
Sarbanes-Oxley era may ﬁnd the implications for high quality
forecasts of real estate earning to be an appealing investment
concept.
Why is real estate so frequently cast as the marginalized asset class? This question
may strike an economist as normative; however, for institutional investors who
have been in the game long enough, this question begs many answers.1 It seems
that every time real estate allocations gain ground in the institutional investment
community, some element of moral hazard, private information, or transaction
costs knocks aggregate allocations back. Theory may justify 20%, a topic
addressed by Fogler (1984), but for institutional investors, practice seems to reveal
a darker side to the story.
What should be of interest to institutional investors is a more recent controversy
involving earnings forecasts for the public-equity quadrant of real estate.2 This so-
called controversy has been described in The Wall Street Journal and Barron’s as
a combination of misuse and misunderstanding of the real estate investment trust
(REIT) performance measure, funds from operations (or, FFO), and the generally
accepted accounting principle (GAAP) earnings measure, net income (NI). In
short, FFO is currently deﬁned as NI (computed in accordance with GAAP),
excluding gains (or losses) from sales of property, plus depreciation and
amortization, and after adjustments for unconsolidated partnerships and joint
ventures (NAREIT, 2002). FFO, which was originally intended as a supplemental
performance measurement to NI, has become the industry-wide benchmark for
performance. Its popularity in the institutional investment community has
contributed to it becoming a substitute for, as opposed to a complement of, REIT
NI forecasts. Nonetheless, FFO forecasts have their detractors. The common
criticisms are: (1) it is not governed by GAAP; (2) it is not audited and, therefore,258  Downs and Gu ¨ner
is not scrutinized as closely as NI; and (3) REIT managers take too many liberties
in how it is reported (The Wall Street Journal, 1998). More recent criticism has
maintained that the continually evolving deﬁnition of FFO3 remains ﬂawed
(Vinocur, 1999).4 The controversy seemed to have come to a head during the
summer of 2001 when analysts at several brokerages announced they would begin
forecasting NI for REITs (The Wall Street Journal, 2001a, b). Despite the harsh
words found in the popular press, an objective assessment has not yet been offered
about the REIT FFO controversy as it relates to analyst ability to forecast this
measure.
The purpose of this study is to examine the quality of FFO forecasts for REITs,
thus contributing to the collective understanding of how investors might beneﬁt
from FFO forecasts. Aside from describing FFO forecasts, these forecasts are
compared to NI forecasts for various groups of non-REITs. Speciﬁcally, the
research examines whether there is a difference between the quality of REIT FFO
forecasts and non-REIT EPS forecasts. In addition, a direct test of FFO and EPS
forecast quality is provided for a small group of REITs that have forecasts of both
FFO and EPS during part of the sample period.
The ﬁndings show that REIT FFO forecast quality is higher than that of EPS for
all the comparison groups examined. Furthermore, this ﬁnding is robust to the
imposition of several ﬁlters. Moreover, the results are not an artifact of the
difference in the level of attention REITs and non-REIT comparison groups get
from the investment community. This ﬁnding is quite interesting and it might have
important investment implications for individual as well as institutional investors.
The balance of this paper is organized as follows. The data sources and some
descriptive measures on FFO and EPS forecasts are discussed in the next section.
Following that the forecast quality metrics used in this study are described. A
fourth section summarizes the hypotheses and presents the empirical ﬁndings. This
section also offers several robustness checks on the ﬁndings. A separate section
elaborates on implications of the ﬁndings for institutional investors. The ﬁnal
section contains concluding remarks.
 FFO Forecasts
The data for the study are obtained from First Call’s Institutional Brokers Estimate
System (I/B/E/S).TheI/B/E/Scontains estimates from multiple forecasters who
report their predictions to the I/B/E/Sservice. The I/B/E/Sdatabase also reports
the actual earnings (e.g., NI, FFO, etc.) released by ﬁrms.5 These data are merged
to form the initial sample of all ﬁrms, REITs and non-REITs, with valid forecasts
for calendar years 1998 through 2001. The examination period is based on the
attention REIT earnings received from FFO and GAAP proponents during this
time period.
The First Call data, as described on the company’s website, are recognized by
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Exhibit 1  Number of REIT Forecasts Reported by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System
Calendar
Year
Number of REITs with
Earnings Estimates







1998 136 89.0 6.6 4.4
1999 128 86.0 3.1 10.9
2000 120 97.5 0.8 1.7
2001 113 64.6 2.7 32.7
Notes: This exhibit reports the total number of REITs included in the sample. Furthermore, it shows
the proportion of REITs with (a) only FFO estimates, (b) only EPS estimates, and (c) both FFO and
EPS estimates during the examination period. Numbers reported in this exhibit conﬁrm the general
notion that FFO is the main valuation variable for REITs. Also, the observed increase in the
proportion of REITs with both FFO and EPS estimates in 2001 is consistent with the fact that
analysts at several brokerages announcing that they would begin forecasting NI for REITs in 2001.
the timeliest and the most consistent data of any of the estimate services.
Nonetheless, the historical data for REITs are less than ideal. Again, as reported
on the First Call website, FFO per share is reported for REITs ‘‘in lieu of earnings,
because FFO is the main valuation yardstick for REITs.’’ This background
information goes on to say that ‘‘very few analysts provide EPS estimates on
REITs.’’Exhibit 1 illustrates this caveat in REIT forecast data. From 1998 to 2001,
the number of REITs with estimates in the I/B/E/S system declined from 136 to
113. This trend is consistent with a general level of consolidation in the industry.
At the same time, the proportion of REITs with FFO forecasts, exclusively,
decreases precipitously to less than two-thirds in 2001. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the brewing controversy reported in the popular press at that time and the
profession by several brokers that they will begin forecasting earnings as NI from
REITs.
These events were viewed as an opportunity (i.e., natural experiment) to conduct
a more systematic comparison of REIT FFO forecasts. Exhibit 2 shows a graph
of forecast and actual earnings (e.g., NI and FFO, each on a per share basis)
across the sample period, 1998–2001. Several observations are readily apparent.
First, REIT earnings as measured by FFO per share are greater than the earnings
of non-REITs. The exact reason for this difference is neither evident from this
data nor is it the focus of this study. One can only speculate with the data as to
whether this difference is due to industry differences or to the effects of ‘‘adding
back in’’ the depreciation of property for FFO. The second observation is the
year-to-year change in actual earnings for REITs and non-REITs. The REITs
represented in Exhibit 2 appear to have a generally stable upward trend in year-
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a marked decrease in earnings from 1998 to 2000, with an increase in earnings
for calendar year 2001. The year-to-year change for the non-REITs appears to be
more volatile than the change in REIT earnings.6 Overall, the REIT earnings
forecasts seem to be more ‘‘in-line’’ with the actual earnings reported at the end
of the ﬁscal year. Some investment houses have touted the ‘‘terriﬁc earnings
visibility’’of property stock after observing characteristics such as those in Exhibit
2 (Deutsche Banc Alex Brown). Although ‘‘enlightened graph reading’’ may offer
some interesting generalizations, the purpose of this paper is to present an
objective assessment of FFO forecast quality. The next section describes the
forecast quality measures used in this study and commonly employed in the
accounting and economics literature.
 Measuring Quality
Two measures of forecast quality are calculated for each ﬁrm in the I/B/E/S
dataset. Each of the measures captures a different attribute of quality. The ﬁrst
measure, accuracy, captures the margin of error in the forecast. Accuracy is deﬁned
here as the standardized and unsigned error of all forecasts for a speciﬁc ﬁrm at
a speciﬁc point in time. It is calculated using the following:
(mean forecast  actual value ) it it Accuracy  Abs , (1)  it actual valueit
where Accuracyit is the absolute value of the quotient of the mean forecastit
provided by all analysts of a speciﬁc ﬁrm i for ﬁscal year t less the actual valueit
announced by ﬁrm i for that ﬁscal year t divided by the actual valueit. Accuracy
shows the percentage deviation of mean forecast of analysts from the actual value
announced by the ﬁrm. It measures the size of the forecast error but not the
direction of it.
The second measure of quality, precision, captures the extent of agreement among
analysts’ forecasts, independent of the actual or realized earnings. Speciﬁcally,
precision is the unsigned and standardized variability of forecasts by analysts.
Precision is calculated by the following:
stdev of forecastsit Precision  Abs , (2)  it mean forecastit
where Precisionit is the absolute value of the quotient of the standard deviation of
forecasts provided by all analysts for a speciﬁc ﬁrm i in ﬁscal year t divided by262  Downs and Gu ¨ner
the mean forecast value. Precision is directly related to the degree of dispersion
across analysts’ forecasts of earnings for a speciﬁc ﬁrm.
The claim that accuracy and precision capture distinct attributes of quality bears
further examination. Take, for instance, a scenario in which three analysts forecast
earnings per share to be $1.05, $1.10, and $1.15 for a hypothetical ﬁrm, Apple.
At the same time, three analysts—whether or not they are the same analysts
covering Apple is immaterial—forecast earnings per share to be $1.24, $1.25, and
$1.26 for another hypothetical ﬁrm, Orange. Assume that Apple and Orange each
have actual earnings of $1.00 per share. The objective is to calculate the accuracy
and precision for each ﬁrm and compare the resulting measures.
In the case of Apple, accuracy is 10% and is calculated as:
$1.05  $1.10  $1.15
 $1.00  3  10%.
(3)  $1.00
Likewise, the accuracy of the forecasts for Orange is 25%. The quality, as
determined by accuracy, of the Apple forecasts is superior to those of Orange.
The calculation of precision is equally straightforward given the standard
deviations of forecasts for each ﬁrm. To a ﬁrst approximation, the dispersion
among the Apple forecasts is ﬁve times that of the Orange forecasts. The Orange
forecasts, though less accurate, are simply more precise. Intuitively, the set of
forecasts for a single ﬁrm generated by all analysts might be quite accurate—
there might not be much difference between the mean forecast by analysts and
the actual earnings reported by the ﬁrm—but these average forecasts can, at the
same time, be very imprecise due to disagreement among analysts regarding future
earnings. Similarly, the earnings forecast of analysts for a ﬁrm might be quite
precise—there might be agreement among analysts regarding what the earnings
of this ﬁrm will be—but inaccurate because the mean forecast by analysts might
differ substantially from the actual earnings reported by the ﬁrm.
When there is agreement among analysts regarding what the earnings of a ﬁrm
will be, announcement of actual earnings that are widely different from the mean
forecast might have a higher surprise effect. On the other hand, when there is not
agreement among analysts regarding what the earnings of a ﬁrm will be, then
announcement of actual earnings that are widely different from the mean forecast
might have a lower surprise effect because different earnings numbers are reported
to the public by the analysts. Therefore, the precision measure combined with the
accuracy measure might provide an idea about the surprise effect created by actual
earnings announcement of the ﬁrm.
Before examining the quality of analyst’s forecasts statistically, consider two more
graphs. Exhibits 3 and 4 are constructed based on calendar year 1998 throughOn the Quality of FFO Forecasts  263
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2002 forecasts. Furthermore, the analysis is limited to ﬁrms with a December
ﬁscal year end. In constructing these exhibits and for all subsequent tests, the
I/B/E/S calendar-based current ﬁscal year and actual earnings per share are used
for the entire sample period. The current exhibits begin in February of the forecast
year and end in January of the following year due to the I/B/E/S convention of
rolling over calendar years in the month following the ﬁscal year end, which here
is a December ﬁscal year end. In addition, both exhibits show quality measures
of forecasts for REIT FFO and non-REIT NI.
The decreasing optimism seen in Exhibit 2 across the ﬁscal year is evident in the
diminishing error (improved accuracy) across months in Exhibit 3. The fact that
analysts revise ﬁscal year forecasts based on quarterly reports is well documented
(Crichﬁeld, Dyckman, and Lakonishok, 1978) and intuitively appealing. What is
not evident in Exhibit 2 is the degree and trend of forecast precision across the
calendar year. Interestingly, the degree of precision for REIT FFO forecasts, as
seen in Exhibit 4, appears to be considerably better than the precision of non-
REIT NI forecasts. However, the extent to which these results may have been
affected by casting the non-REIT net too wide is addressed in the subsequent
analysis.
Although Exhibits 3 and 4 reveal a compelling story regarding the high quality
of REIT FFO forecasts, graphical exhibits do not include the distribution of
accuracy and precision measures across the representative comparison groups. In
other words, the paper has yet to demonstrate statistical signiﬁcance based on
testable hypotheses. For these tests, the analysis is limited to quality measures in
the last month of the ﬁscal year (i.e., January based on I/B/E/S-convention since
all December ﬁscal year end data are used), thus removing the effect of seasonality
in the data.
 Hypothesis Tests
The empirical analysis relies on a simple, yet straightforward, research hypothesis
that the quality of REIT FFO forecasts is equal to the quality of the comparison
group. The alternative hypothesis allows for REIT FFO forecast quality to be
greater or less than the comparison group; consequently, a two-sided test is
considered. A standard t-test for two sample means is utilized throughout the
paper.7 The comparison groups begin with all non-REIT ﬁrms in the I/B/E/Sdata
set. Since all ﬁrms with a wide cross-section of characteristics are allowed in these
tests, various ﬁlters are applied to ensure that the results are robust and not unduly
inﬂuenced by outliers. In addition, industry-level comparison groups are used to
control for any concern that industry-speciﬁc considerations are driving the results.
Comparing REIT FFO to Non-REIT NI Forecasts
Exhibit 5 compares the quality of FFO forecasts for REITs to NI forecasts for



























































































Exhibit 4  REIT versus Non-REIT Precision
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H0: 1  2
t-Stat p-value
Panel A: Full sample
Accuracy (%) 461 7.40 15,172 61.37 7.5 0.00
Precision (%) 430 2.01 12,286 18.50 14.6 0.01
Panel B: Filtered sample
Accuracy (%) 389 3.93 7,965 8.32 7.3 0.01
Precision (%) 389 1.17 7,954 4.47 30.4 0.01
Notes: This exhibit shows the results of a test for the equality of accuracy and precision measures
for REIT FFO and non-REIT EPS forecasts using a t-test for two sample means. Results of these tests
are reported in the last two columns of the exhibit. Panel A has the results for the full sample of
REITs and non-REITs available in the I/B/E/S data set. Panel B shows the results for a ﬁltered
sample. The sample of ﬁrms analyzed in Panel B have stock prices greater than or equal to $5
per share, accuracy measures less than or equal to 1, precision measures less than or equal to
0.25 and number of estimates greater than or equal to 3.
sample; that is all ﬁrms in the I/B/E/S data with a December ﬁscal year end. For
the four years in the sample period, 1998–2001, there are 461 REITs with
sufﬁcient data to calculate accuracy. The mean value of accuracy across all these
ﬁrms is 7.40%. In contrast, accuracy is calculated based on NI for over 15,000
non-REITs during the sample period. The mean non-REIT accuracy is 61.37%.
A test of the equality of means for these two accuracy measures rejects the null
hypothesis that they are equal with a corresponding probability of less than 1%.
Likewise, the test of equality for the precision measure yields a rejection of the
null hypothesis with a probability of less than 1%. From these tests, the ﬁndings
indicate that REIT FFO forecasts are of higher quality than non-REIT NI forecasts.
As with any empirical test, various competing inﬂuences are considered, not the
least of which is data problems. For this reason, the analyses are repeated by
imposing some ﬁlters on the data. Panel A, which reports results for the full
sample of ﬁrms, serves as a baseline for comparison. Panel B of each exhibit
shows the results for a ﬁltered sample of ﬁrms.8 The ﬁrms included in this ﬁltered
sample have stock prices greater than or equal to $5, forecasts from at least three
analysts, accuracy measures that are less than or equal to 1, and dispersion
measures that are less than or equal to 0.25.
The robustness of the results between REITs and non-REITs is shown in Panels
A and B (the full and the ﬁltered samples, respectively) of Exhibit 5. In particular,On the Quality of FFO Forecasts  267
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H0: 1  2
t-Stat p-value
Panel A: Full sample
Accuracy (%) 461 7.40 2,495 54.52 7.8 0.01
Precision (%) 430 2.01 2,007 18.04 9.9 0.01
Panel B: Filtered sample
Accuracy (%) 389 3.93 1,245 10.64 9.2 0.01
Precision (%) 389 1.17 1,242 4.87 20.7 0.01
Notes: This exhibit shows the results of a test for the equality of accuracy and precision measures
for REIT FFO and high tech ﬁrm EPS forecasts using a t-test for two sample means. The results of
these tests are reported in the last two columns of the exhibit. Panel A shows the results for the full
sample of REITs and high tech ﬁrms available in the I/B/E/S data set. Panel B shows the results
for a ﬁltered sample. The sample of ﬁrms analyzed in Panel B have stock prices greater than or
equal to $5 per share, accuracy measures less than or equal to 1, precision measures less than or
equal to 0.25, and number of estimates greater than or equal to 3.
Panel B ﬁlters have reduced the REIT sample by approximately 15%, whereas
the non-REIT sample decreases by approximately 50%. The application of ﬁlters
in the analysis demonstrates the potential inﬂuence of ﬁrms with low stock prices,
low levels of analyst attention, and data outliers. Nonetheless, the conclusions
regarding REIT FFO forecast quality relative to non-REIT NI quality remain
consistent.9
Comparing REIT FFO to Industry-Specific NI Forecasts
The preceding comparison of REITs to all non-REITs may leave open the issue
of whether these results are inﬂuenced by not controlling for industry-speciﬁc
concerns.10 To address this concern, the analysis is repeated with two industry-
speciﬁc comparison groups. In Exhibit 6, a comparison group is identiﬁed based
on the I/B/E/S industry classiﬁcation for high tech ﬁrms. The REIT measures
shown in Panels A and B of Exhibit 6 are identical to those in Exhibit 5. The
high tech ﬁrms with sufﬁcient data to calculate the accuracy measure number
2,495. The mean accuracy for all high tech ﬁrms is 54.52%. As was the case in
the comparison of REITs to non-REITs, the null hypothesis is rejected. In Panel
B of Exhibit 6, the sample of high tech ﬁrms decreases by 50%, which is
comparable to the ﬁltering effect on the full non-REIT sample. In the case of the
high tech ﬁrms, accuracy decreases to a more reasonable level of 10% and268  Downs and Gu ¨ner






H0: 1  2
t-Stat p-value
Panel A: Full sample
Accuracy (%) 461 7.40 930 50.03 3.9 0.01
Precision (%) 430 2.01 879 16.66 6.4 0.01
Panel B: Filtered sample
Accuracy (%) 389 3.93 642 9.12 6.3 0.01
Precision (%) 389 1.17 641 5.03 16.9 0.01
Notes: This exhibit shows the results of a test for the equality of accuracy and precision measures
for REIT FFO and utility ﬁrm EPS forecasts using a t-test for two sample means. Results of these
tests are reported in the last two columns of the exhibit. Panel A shows the results for the full
sample of REITs and utility ﬁrms available in the I/B/E/S data set. Panel B shows the results for
a ﬁltered sample. The sample of ﬁrms analyzed in Panel B have stock prices greater than or equal
to $5 per share, accuracy measures less than or equal to 1, precision measures less than or equal
to 0.25, and number of estimates greater than or equal to 3.
precision decreases to under 5% in Panel B. Nonetheless, the difference between
REIT FFO forecast quality and forecast quality for high tech ﬁrms is still
statistically signiﬁcant.
A similar story is revealed in Exhibit 7 where REIT FFO forecasts are compared
to NI forecasts for the utility industry. Across the four-year sample period, there
are slightly less than 1,000 ﬁrm-year observations for utility ﬁrms. The same
result, that the accuracy and precision of FFO forecasts is better for REITs relative
to the NI forecasts for utility ﬁrms, is evident. A minor difference evident in this
exhibit is that few utility ﬁrms are lost when additional ﬁlters are applied to the
data. However, the overall result is consistent. In both the high tech and utility
comparisons, evidence reported in Panel A is robust to the ﬁlters as shown in the
respective B panels.
These results are somewhat surprising. By focusing on utility and high tech ﬁrms,
the concept was to capture two somewhat extreme comparison groups to REITs.
Stable earnings and low growth rates frequently characterize the utility industry.
The same might be said about REITs where leases are, generally, long term and
backed by tangible assets. On the other hand, much of the high tech industry has
been characterized by high informational asymmetry and high growth rates. At
the same time, the earnings of high tech ﬁrms have been volatile, if notOn the Quality of FFO Forecasts  269
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H0: 1  2
t-Stat p-value
Panel A: Full sample
Accuracy (%) 37 0.78 35 25.71 4.7 0.01
Precision (%) 37 0.55 22 12.76 3.9 0.01
Panel B: Filtered sample
Accuracy (%) 36 0.80 10 9.93 3.8 0.01
Precision (%) 36 0.55 10 6.52 3.0 0.01
Notes: This exhibit shows the results of a test for the equality of accuracy and precision measures
for REIT FFO and EPS forecasts using a t-test for two sample means. Results of these tests are
reported in the last two columns of the exhibit. Panel A shows the results for the full sample of
REITs with FFO and EPS forecasts in the I/B/E/S data set. Panel B shows the results for a ﬁltered
sample. The sample of ﬁrms analyzed in Panel B have stock prices greater than or equal to $5
per share, accuracy measures less than or equal to 1, precision measures less than or equal to
0.25, and number of estimates greater than or equal to 3.
nonexistent, and frequently backed by intangible assets. Yet, surprisingly, in each
case the REIT FFO forecast quality appears to exceed that of the comparison
group.
Comparing REIT FFO to REIT NI Forecasts
Having compared REIT FFO forecasts to the NI forecasts of non-REITs, the
discussion turns to what might be considered a more direct test of the quality of
FFO forecasts. Exhibit 8 shows the quality measures for a matched sample of
REITs with FFO and NI forecasts. As shown in Exhibit 1, 32.7% of the 113
REITs in 2001, or 37 REITs, have FFO and EPS estimates. Panel A of Exhibit 8
shows the accuracy and precision calculations for each group without any ﬁlters
on the data. In this case, the REIT FFO forecast accuracy is less than 1% whereas
the NI accuracy is approximately 25%. This difference is statistically signiﬁcant
at a very high level of conﬁdence. Comparing the precision measure between FFO
and NI forecasts, a similar result is found whereby the FFO forecast is, again, of
higher quality than the NI forecast.
As restrictive ﬁlters are imposed on the data in an effort to ensure the results are
not driven by outliers or data errors, the main ﬁnding remains valid: FFO forecasts270  Downs and Gu ¨ner






H0: 1  2
t-Stat p-value
Panel A: Full sample
Non-REITs 454 7.62 14,780 6.37 6.1 0.01
High tech ﬁrms 454 7.62 2,411 5.99 7.0 0.01
Utility ﬁrms 454 7.62 924 9.71 6.9 0.01
REITs (NI) 37 9.41 35 1.97 11.5 0.01
Panel B: Filtered sample
Non-REITs 389 8.49 7,971 9.22 3.5 0.01
High tech ﬁrms 389 8.49 1,248 8.88 1.4 0.16
Utility ﬁrms 389 8.49 642 11.95 10.4 0.01
REITs (NI) 36 9.61 10 3.20 10.3 0.01
Notes: This exhibit shows the results of a test for equality in the number of FFO estimates for REITs
and various comparison groups. The test is a t-test for sample means. Results of these tests are
reported in the last two columns of the exhibit. The comparison groups are identiﬁed in the ﬁrst
column of this exhibit. Panel A reports the results for the full sample of REITs and the
corresponding comparison group available in the I/B/E/S data set. Panel B shows the results for
a ﬁltered sample. The sample of ﬁrms analyzed in Panel B have stock prices greater than or equal
to $5 per share, accuracy measures less than or equal to 1, precision measures less than or equal
to 0.25, and number of estimates greater than or equal to 3.
are of signiﬁcantly higher quality than NI forecasts for a matched sample of REITs
in 2001.
Does Analyst Attention Influence Forecast Quality?
One factor that might be of particular interest in explaining the quality differences
seen across comparison groups is the level of attention these ﬁrms receive from
analysts (Downs and Gu ¨ner, 2000). In other words, should one group of ﬁrms
receive more attention from analysts (i.e., a higher number of estimates or
forecasts), this may inﬂuence the quality of forecasts.
Exhibit 9 attempts to address this issue by reporting the number of forecasts, a
proxy for the level of analyst attention ﬁrms receive in the calculation of ﬁscal
year end quality. Both panels of Exhibit 9 report the number of forecasts of REIT
FFO versus the corresponding comparison group that is listed in the ﬁrst columnOn the Quality of FFO Forecasts  271
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of the exhibit. As in all other exhibits, an equality of means test is reported in the
last two columns.
Some interesting trends are seen across the comparison groups and across panels.
First, as can be seen in Exhibit 9, the number of REIT FFO forecasts is
signiﬁcantly greater than the number of non-REIT NI forecasts when there are no
ﬁlters on the data. However, as the ﬁlters (as previously described) are applied to
the data, the relationship reverses. In the ﬁltered sample, the number of forecasts
of REIT FFO is signiﬁcantly less than the number of NI forecasts for non-REITs.
A similar trend is evident between REITs and high tech ﬁrms; however, the
difference between the two groups is not signiﬁcant in the ﬁltered sample. In
sharp contrast, the number of utility ﬁrms’ NI forecasts is always signiﬁcantly
greater than the number of REIT FFO forecasts. This result may be due to the
interest that analysts believe institutions have in utility ﬁrms.
Finally, the ﬁndings reveal that REIT FFO forecasts always outnumber the
forecasts of REIT NI. Interestingly, the mean of three NI forecasts for the ten
REITs in Panel B of Exhibit 9 is consistent with the number of brokerages that
announced their intent to issue NI forecasts midway through ﬁscal year 2001 for
REITs.
 Institutional Investment Implications
Users of FFO estimates will clearly beneﬁt from recognizing the quality of REIT
forecasts. Valuation models for real estate investments are predominantly driven
by cash ﬂow projections. Given that FFO is more directly related to cash ﬂow
than GAAP NI, institutional investors will want to be mindful of the mitigated
estimation risk in forecasting real estate cash ﬂows, at least in the public-equity
quadrant.
Furthermore, the ﬁnding that FFO forecast quality exceeds NI quality for the high
tech and utility industries suggests that institutional investors may assign less
valuation risk to the traditionally ‘‘marginalized’’ asset class of real estate. This
fact may be even more relevant as institutional investors chase the next trendy
high tech investment or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, the stodgy arena of
income equities.
In addition, portfolio managers—here referring to equity managers and real estate
managers—may, in concert, elect to assign higher allocations to real estate and
REITs in return for the beneﬁts of high quality analyst forecasts. In other words,
portfolio managers could perceive less valuation risk in publicly-traded real estate,
thereby assigning higher allocations to the real estate asset class as a whole.
Recognizing that FFO forecasts do not preclude using forecasts of NI for REITs,
institutional investors could watch for arbitrage opportunities where economically272  Downs and Gu ¨ner
signiﬁcant differences exist in FFO and NI multiples. Such research should be of
continued interest and beneﬁt to the institutional investment community.
 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the quality of FFO forecasts, the subject of
considerable negative reaction in the popular press, is far less a shortcoming than
a positive hallmark for the historically beleaguered real estate industry. In essence,
REIT FFO forecasts are of higher quality relative to each and every one of the
comparison groups during the examination period of this study. In addition, the
ﬁndings reveal that this result is not likely to be due to a differential level of
analyst following these ﬁrms.
Investors may ﬁnd these results particularly appealing given the attention
ﬁduciaries have received in the post-Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley environment.
Whether an institution is legally obligated through the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) or, perhaps, more severely obligated by the court
of public opinion, there is some conciliation in allocating assets to income-
producing real estate, particularly given the high quality of public-equity real
estate’s FFO forecasts. Stated differently, the enviable earnings visibility, as
measured by FFO forecast quality, argues for publicly-traded real estate as an
asset class in the portfolio of those seeking transparency and disclosure credibility.
Finally, the results may shed important light on the work of Higgins, Ott, and Van
Ness (2006). Their study investigates the information content of the 1999 revision
to the deﬁnition of FFO. While the work offers an important discussion of
transparency issues related to publicly-traded real estate, the statistical signiﬁcance
of the ﬁndings are not strong. This may be due, in large part, to the fact that a
history of high quality REIT forecasts implies a low degree of uncertainty
regarding FFO calculation prior to the 1999 announcement. Consequently, the
empirical work of Higgins, Ott, and Van Ness supports the notion that a marginal
change in transparency and disclosure yields minimal economic impact.
 Endnotes
1 For institutional or individual investors looking for a better appreciation of ‘‘what was
promised’’ and ‘‘what was delivered’’ in institutional real estate from the 1970s to the
early 1990s, right at the start of the REIT boom, please see Downs and Hartzell (1995).
2 See Hudson-Wilson (2001) for a discussion of real estate quadrants and investment
rationale for institutional investors.
3 FFO was ﬁrst deﬁned in 1991 with clarifying revisions issued in 1995, 1999, and 2002.
4 Higgins, Ott, and Van Ness (2006) study the information content of the 1999 revision
to the deﬁnition of FFO.
5 It is important to note that most analysts issue earnings forecasts on a continuing
operations basis. Consequently, I/B/E/S receives analysts’ forecasts after discontinuedOn the Quality of FFO Forecasts  273
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operations, extra-ordinary charges, and other non-operating items have been backed out.
Likewise I/B/E/S adjusts reported earnings to match analysts’ forecasts so there is a
basis for comparison.
6 The apparently higher volatility of EPS for non-REITs relative to FFO for REITs might
partially explain higher quality of REIT FFO estimates during the sample period.
7 The equality of means tests throughout the paper are also conducted using nonparametric
statistics. The results based on nonparametric analyses are qualitatively similar to those
reported here. To conserve space, these ﬁndings are not reported in the paper; however,
they are available from the authors upon request.
8 The original empirical analyses imposed several ﬁlters sequentially. The ﬁrst ﬁlter
constrains the full sample to ﬁrms with stock prices greater than $5 per share. Then two
more ﬁlters are imposed on the data requiring ﬁrms to have forecasts from at least three
analysts and accuracy measures less than 3. The results obtained for these sub-samples
are qualitatively the same as the ones reported in Panels A and B of each exhibit. They
are not reported in the paper to conserve space and are available from the authors upon
request.
9 While the predictability of FFO and NI may seems to be related to the current
investigation, it is in fact a narrower topic. The empirical analysis in the paper focuses
on the cross-section of forecast estimates as the relevant basis for quality. Predictability
between and among forecasts and actual metrics implies certain assumptions regarding
the ability of analysts to learn from past mistakes. Although this topic is interesting, it
is not the focus of the current study.
10 For an analysis of industry effects on forecast quality of analysts, see Jaggi (1980) and
Kwon (2002).
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